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CORRESPONDENCE

MUTUALITY OF ESTOPPEL:
A QUESTION
To the Editors:
A recent Note, "A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine of
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, " 1 made excellent use of elementary probability theory to demonstrate the extent to which relaxation of the mutuality requirement will increase the damages
suffered by a defendant subject to multiple suits in which there
is common issue (or correspondingly, will decrease the total recovery of a plaintiff who has several suits litigating a common
issue against different defendants). Although the author made a
number of useful points concerning the case law and the arguments advanced by proponents on each side of the controversy,
the central thesis of the Note was an argument for retaining the
mutuality requirement based on this difference in the anticipated
losses of a given defendant. In effect, this thesis takes the distribution of risks given a mutuality of estoppel rule as presumptively correct, thus evading the principal issue. The issue really
is the estimate of damages upon which the prospective participant in a litigation should be made to act.
Consider, for example, a particular type of case that often
entails multiple suits involving a common issue: product liability
suits. Suppose "the Company" manufactures a product with a
putative defect. Assume this putative defect could be "remedied"
at a cost of S dollars, reducing injuries from the use of the product
by R dollars. Assume, further, that it is desirable to attempt to
assure that the "defect" is remedied if and only if S is less than
R. 2 The Company, however, will make its decision whether to
remedy the defect on the basis of a different comparison: The cost
1. 76 MtCH. L. REV. 612 (1978).

2. This assumption concerning the goal of tort law is made for convenience of exposition, and is not intended to be a denial of the validity of other goals or concerns of tort.
law. In particular, a decision not to remedy a defect where the avoidance cost is only
slightly higher than the accident cost, although justified under the assumption above, will
result in the transfer of wealth from plaintiffs to attorneys and other intermediaries if the
defendant's litigation costs are set equal to the plaintiffs accident costs. Whether this
redistribution of wealth is acceptable depends upon what classes the plaintiffs are likely
to be from as well as upon who the determining agency is.
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of remedying, S, against the Company's expected litigation cost,
L. But L depends upon the rules respecting collateral estoppel,
as the Note demonstrated, since - if strict liability law is not
applicable - each suit by a plaintiff against the Company will
entail a common issue of whether the defect should have been
remedied, in addition to separate issues of the causal relation of
the alleged defect to the injury. As the Note showed, given the
existence of a mutuality of estoppel restriction, the Company's
expected litigation cost, Lm,' is less than its expected litigation
cost in the absence of such limitation on collateral estoppel, L 0 •
If Lm <Lo<R, it would be preferable to impose a mutuality restriction on collateral estoppel in order to reduce the incidence of
occasions on which the Company would make the decision that
society does not wish it to make. The Company will wrongly
decide not to remedy the defect only when S is more than the
litigation cost L but less than the real cost R. When Lm<L 0 <R,
forcing the company to use L~- rather than Lm reduces the size
of that zone of error. Thus, whenever the Company would decide wrongly by considering its litigation costs on the basis of no
mutuality restriction on collateral estoppel (that is, whenever S
is between Rand ~ 0 ), Swill also be between Rand Lm, so the
Company would also have made the wrong decision if it had
acted on the assumption that there was a mutuality restriction
upon collateral estoppel. On the other hand, whenever S is
between L,m and L 0 , the Company would decide correctly if it
assumed there was no mutuality restriction but would decide
incorrectly if it assumed there was a mutuality restriction.
Thus the critical question is whether it is more reasonable to
anticipate that for this category of cases R will be greater than
L 0 , in which event there should not be a mutuality restriction on
collateral estoppel, or that R will be less than Lm, in which event
there should be a mutuality restriction. (If R is between the two
estimates of litigation cost, the question turns upon which estimate of litigation cost is "closer" to R in a sense which depends
on the probability distribution of safety costs and is beyond the
scope of a letter.)
Further analysis indicates that in general R will be greater
than L 0 • If
C is the collection of all cases c that might be brought alleging
injury as a result of the defect,
D(c) is the damages suffered in case c, and
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P(c) is the probability that the evidence that could be presented
in case c indicates the needed causal relation between defect and
injury,

then the true cost of not remedying the defect is
R

L

=

D(c) x P(c).

cEC

At the same time, if
D'(c} is the damage award that a jury would give in a case presenting the evidence available in case c, were it to decide for the plaintiff,
J(c) is the probability that the issue of causation will be decided
in favor of the plaintiff in any given case, and
p is the probability that the issue of liability for failure to remedy
the defect will be decided in favor of the plaintiff in any given case,

and if p is independent of the other two variables, then the
expected litigation cost given a mutuality restriction under
collateral estoppel is
Lm

L

=

p x D'(c) x J(c),

cEC

which can be rewritten as
Lm

=

pxT

where T is the anticipated cost of litigation if the issue of liabil~
ity for failure to remedy the defect were foreclosed against the
defendant ab initio.
In these terms, the Note demonstrated that the expected
litigation cost on the assumption that there is no mutuality restriction on collateral estoppel would be Lo = k x T, where k is
less than one but larger than p. Where there are numerous suits,
k is exceedingly close to one.
Thus, it would be sufficient to know that T is less than or not much more than - R. 3 But if jury awards are approximately equal to actual damages and if juries decide the causation issue in favor of plaintiffs approximately as often as the
plaintiffs are in fact correct in their assertion, then T is less than
3. The critical situation is where the outcome of the "defect" question is not substantially certain. If the probability of plaintiff winning the defect issue is nearly 100%, the
collateral estoppel rule is essentially irrelevant since the difference between the two estimates of litigation cost are very small. But if the chance of any given plaintiff succeeding
on the "defect" issue is, say, 50% then Lm is only 1h of T, so L 0 is a better estimate of
R even if T were, say, 20% higher than R.
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R, since those assumptions imply that T differs from R only insofar as there are sonie injuries upon which no suit is brought. 4
To dispute the conclusion that T is less than or equal to R,
and hence to dispute the conclusion that the probability analysis
favors no mutuality restriction upon collateral estoppel in this
category of cases, it is necessary to show either that the damages
awarded by juries in this category of lawsuits are significantly
higher than real damages or that juries favor plaintiffs too often
on the causation issue. Although such contentions have been
made, based on the award of "pain and suffering" and on assumptions about jury behavior in regard to insurance coverage,
none of those arguments have indicated that the average cost of
a litigated suit includes a sufficient "premium" to overcome the
underestimation resulting from situations where the plaintiff's
chance of winning on the "defect" issue is significantly less than
100%. Accordingly, the probability analysis of the Note is
actually favorable to arguments for elimination of the mutuality
restriction on collateral estoppel with respect to this category
of cases rather than being favorable to arguments for retention
of the restriction.

Stephen Millman
New York, New York
Reply:
Mr. Millman makes two points in his letter: first, that my
thesis is based upon the presumptive validity of the distribution
of outcomes under the doctrine of mutuality of collateral estoppel
and thus assumes its conclusion, and second, that my own analysis argues for the abandonment of mutuality (a point that is
illustrated by the long example in his letter). I disagree on both
counts.
My appeal for the retention of the mutuality requirement is
made on two levels. First, there is an appeal to common sense: It
is not sensible that a litigant's likelihood of success on the issue
of his negligence should depend on the number of persons injured
as a result of that alleged negligence. When trying the issue of a
bus driver's negligence we would not (under any normal set of
4. This assumes that the marginal legal fees and court costs of the defendant are
small in relation to the expected damage awards. One reason for not using strict liability
may be the possibility that T is, in fact, somewhat greater than R. As indicated in note
3 supra, however, the "premium" included in T over R would have to be extremely large
for the mutuality restriction to be preferable.
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circumstances) consider it probative that there were fifteen
rather than four people on the bus and would not admit into
evidence testimony to that effect. It is equally ridiculous that our
procedure should embody a presumption to that effect.
By demonstrating that, when the mutuality requirement is
abandoned, a party's average chances for success on any and
every issue vary with the number of his opponents, I hoped to
show that mutuality makes sense. My assumption was only that
the number of parties on a given side of an issue is generally
irrelevant to the question of which view of the facts is correct, an
assumption that appears so self-evident that stating it explicitly
sounds absurd.
My second approach was to look to the internal consistency
and coherency of legal procedure. My assumption in the second
instance was that judicial fact finding is the proper subject of
decision analysis - that a trial is a situation, like any other in
which human beings confront choice, where facts may be known
with a greater or lesser degree of certainty and where different
outcomes are assigned a greater or lesser degree of desirability.
I then went on to show that the conventional statement of the
burden of persuasion embodies certain assumptions about the
relative value of different outcomes and that the abandonment of
mutuality is inconsistent with those values. If I take anything as
presumptively correct, it is not mutuality but the burden of persuasion. Even there, however, I think it can be argued (and was
argued in the text at notes 29-33) that the burden of persuasion
is more than presumptively correct: a general statement of the
appropriate standard of certainty, without regard to the facts of
any case, in a system whose stated goal is fair compensation must
necessarily be that the finder of fact must find that which is more
likely than not.
As for Mr. Millman's example, although it is not so stated,
his essential premise is that the issue of negligence (i.e., whether
a defect "should have been remedied") should not be tried at all.
(His mathematics shows that, given his stated premises, the outcome is wrong unless the defendant loses on this issue 100% of the
time.) By aligning the issues and parties in his example so that
the abandonment of mutuality tends to result in the preclusion
of the negligence issue, he thus makes it appear that the abandonment of mutuality is generally appropriate.
Mr. Millman's example can readily be refuted by setting up
a slightly different set of facts: A consumer is injured by taking a
medication produced by several manufacturers. Each manufac-
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turer's version of the drug suffers from the same defect. In separate lawsuits against each manufacturer, the consumer must establish that the defect should have been cured. If there is no
mutuality requirement, it is much less likely that the consumer
will, on average, succeed on this issue. Thus, in my example
(given Mr. Millman's assumptions about the desirable distribution of outcomes), mutuality leads to better results. The point is
not, however, that in some cases mutuality is desirable and in
other cases it is not. The lack of mutuality only results in a better
outcome if it results in preclusion of an issue that should not be
tried in the first instance.
The legal solution responsive to Mr. Millman's problem
(given his premise that strict liability results in a better distribution of outcomes) is simply to avoid the issue of negligence by
imposing strict liability. To abandon mutuality, which is by itself
a neutral principle, is not an appropriate response.
David Gruber
New York, New York

